

## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ACDA-10 ISO-00 /017 R

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/PAB:PDCONSTABLE

APPROVED BY: NEA/LBLAINGEN

ACDA/IR PMAYHEW PHONE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 173030

LIMDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT ACTION OTTAWA INFO NEW DELHI IAEA VIENNA  
LONDON OF 8 AUG 74:

QUOTE E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PARM, CAN, IN

SUBJECT: CANADIAN-INDIAN CONSULTATIONS ON NUCLEAR MATTERS

REF: STATE 167869

1. ON AUGUST 7 CANADIAN CHARGE PROVIDED ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE  
WITH WRITTEN SUMMARY BELOW OF CANADIAN-INDIAN CONSULTA-  
TIONS JULY 29-31 ON NUCLEAR MATTERS. SUMMARY IS MARKED CON-  
FIDENTIAL AND CANADIANS ASKED THAT IT BE CLOSELY HELD. IT  
CHARACTERIZES DISCUSSION AS "DIFFICULT BUT NOT ACRIMONIOUS"  
AND REPORTS THAT INDIANS AGREED RECOGNIZE PUBLICLY DIS-  
ADVANTAGES OF UNRESTRICTED PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOS-  
IVE TECHNOLOGY AND TO PLAY ROLE IN CURBING ITS SPREAD.  
CANADIANS URGED INDIANS TO DELAY FURTHER TESTING UNTIL NPT  
REVIEW COMPLETED AND IN FACT NOT TO TEST BEFORE END OF 1975.  
INDIANS SAID THEY NOT OPPOSED TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS, BUT IT  
NOT CLEAR TO CANADIANS TO WHAT DEGREE THEY WOULD SEEK  
APPLICATION THESE SAFEGUARDS TO EVENTUAL INDIAN EXPORTS  
OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT FOR POWER GENERATION.  
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INDIANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN INTERNATIONAL PNE SERVICES

BY NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. MOST DIFFICULT POINT IN TALKS WAS USE OF PLUTONIUM FROM CIRUS REACTOR. INDIANS NOT PREPARED GUARANTEE PLUTONIUM WOULD NOT BE USED FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, BUT CANADIANS MADE CLEAR THAT PERMANENT

RESUMPTION OF PREVIOUS RELATIONS DEPENDED ON SUCH A GUARANTEE.

2. TEXT OF SUMMARY FOLLOWS (UNNECESSARY WORDS OMITTED):

A. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE DIFFICULT BUT NOT ACRIMONIOUS. IT WAS CLEAR INDIANS WERE ANXIOUS TO ACHIEVE SOME MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AND WERE CONCERNED AT POSSIBLE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL DISAPPROVAL. THEY NOT EQUIPPED, HOWEVER, TO MAKE FAR-REACHING CONCESSIONS TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE.

B. INDIANS STARTED FROM THEIR WELL-KNOWN POSITION THAT NPT IS DISCRIMINATORY AND THAT, WHILE THEY WOULD WELCOME UNIVERSAL SYSTEM (THAT IS ONE WHICH INCLUDED ALL FIVE EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES), THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY ELEMENT OF DISCRIMINATION SINCE THIS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO LOK SABAH. THEY WOULD FAVOUR COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN COMBINED WITH CUT-OFF OF FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION FOR MILITARY EXPLOSIVE PURPOSES AND INTERNATIONAL FUEL CYCLE INSPECTION. (THEY WOULD ACCEPT THAT EXISTING WEAPONS STATES COULD KEEP, FOR TIME BEING, FISSILE MATERIAL STOCKPILES ACCUMULATED BEFORE TEST BAN CAME INTO EFFECT.) IN SHORT, IF UTOPIA WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY ACHIEVABLE, INDIA WOULD NOT ACCEPT RESTRICTIONS.

C. AS DISCUSSIONS PROCEEDED, INDIANS AGREED TO RECOGNIZE PUBLICLY DISADVANTAGES OF UNRESTRICTED PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TECHNOLOGY AND TO PLAY ROLE IN CURBING ITS SPREAD. INDIANS CLAIM THAT THEY WILL PLAY AS CONSTRUCTIVE A ROLE AS LOGIC OF THEIR POSITION ON NPT AND ON MERITS OF PNES PERMITS IN REVIEW OF EXISTING NON-PROLIFERATION STRUCTURE.

D. AS CONTRIBUTION TO THIS CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WE URGED INDIANS TO DELAY ANY FURTHER TESTING UNTIL NPT REVIEW WAS CONFIDENTIAL

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COMPLETED AND, IN ANY CASE, NOT TO TEST BEFORE END OF 1975. WE SUGGESTED THAT, ON BASIS OF THEIR OWN PREMISES RELATING TO PEACEFUL USES, THEY SHOULD NOT PROCEED WITH FURTHER TESTING UNLESS COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS INDICATED THAT ECONOMIC GAINS WARRANTED EXPENDITURES TO BE INCURRED. OUR REASON FOR PUTTING FORWARD SUGGESTION WAS HOPE THAT IT COULD PROVIDE INDIANS, DOMESTICALLY, WITH FACE-SAVING BASIS FOR DELAY OR SUSPENSION OF TESTING PROGRAM.

E. INDIANS APPEARED APPRECIATE IMPORTANCE OF RESTRICTING TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY DIRECTLY RELATED TO DEVELOPMENT OF EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. THEY POINTED OUT THEY HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO SELL THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT FUEL PROCESSING CAPABILITY TO OTHERS DESPITE APPROACHES RECEIVED FROM

SEVERAL INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. WHILE LOGIC OF INDIAN POSITION ON ADVANTAGES OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO TAKE PUBLIC POSITION OF REFUSAL TO MAKE PNE TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE TO OTHERS, SINGH LEFT OPEN POSSIBILITY OF PRIVATE ASSURANCES.

F. INDIANS INDICATED THAT THEY NOT OPPOSED TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS, WHICH, OF COURSE, ANTE-DATED AND UNRELATED TO NPT STRUCTURE. IT NOT CLEAR HOWEVER, DEGREE TO WHICH THEY WOULD SEEK APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS TO EVENTUAL INDIAN EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT FOR POWER GENERATION (AND WHICH WOULD THEREFORE BE LESS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY). INDIANS, INCIDENTALLY, SHOWED NO INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL PNE SERVICE PROVIDED BY EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. IN FACT, THEY SEEMED TO HAVE NO WISH TO ENCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT WHICH COULD UNDERMINE RATIONALE FOR THEIR OWN DOMESTIC PNE PROGRAM.

G. STICKING POINT IN THE DISCUSSIONS WAS USE OF PLUTONIUM FROM CIRUS. SINGH EXPLAINED THAT THIS HAD BEEN EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSED IN DELHI AND THAT INDIANS NOT PREPARED TO GIVE GROUND. THEY WERE, HOWEVER, PREPARED TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES THAT PLUTONIUM FROM RAPP WOULD NOT BE USED FOR EXPLOSIVE PURPOSES. WE TOLD INDIANS THAT ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH DID NOT COVER CIRUS WOULD FALL SHORT OF CONFIDENTIAL

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MEETING CANADIAN OBJECTIVES AND WOULD THEREFORE NOT PERMIT RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS ON PREVIOUS BASIS.

H. SINGH URGED US TO PROCEED STEP BY STEP AND TO DEAL WITH WHAT WAS ACHIEVABLE. HE SUGGESTED THAT BOTH SIDES MIGHT WISH TO REPORT TO THEIR MINISTERS AND THAT MATTERS COULD THEN BE PURSUED FURTHER.

I. AFTER INITIAL DISCUSSIONS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL, CALLS WERE ARRANGED FOR SINGH ON SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND PRIME MINISTER. LATTER LIMITED HIMSELF TO UNDERLINING IMPORTANCE CANADA ATTACHED TO NON-PROLIFERATION AND REGRETTED THAT ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN FRANKLY DISCUSSED AND DEALT WITH WHEN HE RAISED PROBLEM WITH MRS.GANDHI THREE YEARS AGO (SEE THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE PRIME

MINISTER AND MRS. GANDHI AT THAT TIME). PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS MIGHT BE HELD IN DELHI IF THERE STILL POSSIBILITIES OF MAKING SOME PROGRESS. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE THAT CANADA PLACED UPON EXCLUDING USE OF PLUTONIUM FROM CIRUS FOR EXPLOSIVE PURPOSES. WHEN SINGH SUGGESTED THAT, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, MORATORIUM WOULD MEET CANADIAN CONCERNS ON CIRUS, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE A STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION. INDIANS WERE WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH CIRUS ISSUE WELL BEFORE END OF ANY MORATORIUM.

J. CANADIAN POSITION ON AID IS THAT COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR FIELD REMAINS SUSPENDED AND CANADA WILL CONCENTRATE ITS AID TO INDIA DURING CURRENT YEAR LARGELY IN FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL AREAS. FURTHER ROUND OF TALKS WITH INDIANS, DEPENDING ON PROGRESS ACHIEVED, COULD CONCEIVABLY PERMIT SOME RELAXATION OF AID RESTRICTIONS. INDIANS WILL HAVE TO DRAW THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS AS TO WHAT CANADIAN ACTION ON AID WOULD BE IF THEY PROCEEDED TO TEST ANOTHER DEVICE. KISSINGER UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** NPT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, NUCLEAR TESTS, NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 12 AUG 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974STATE173030  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** NEA/PAB:PDCONSTABLE  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740221-0412  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740855/aaaabuxg.tel  
**Line Count:** 192  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN NEA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** STATE 167869  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <15 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CANADIAN-INDIAN CONSULTATIONS ON NUCLEAR MATTERS  
**TAGS:** PARM, CA, IN  
**To:** ISLAMABAD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005